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Why are traits that function as secondary sexual ornaments generally exaggerated in size compared to the naturally selected
optimum, and not reduced? Because they deviate from the naturally selected optimum, traits that are reduced in size will handicap
their bearer, and could thus provide an honest signal of quality to a potential mate. Thus if secondary sexual ornaments evolve via
the handicap process, current theory suggests that reduced ornamentation should be as frequent as exaggerated ornamentation,
but this is not the case. To try to explain this discrepancy, we analyze a simple model of the handicap process. Our analysis shows
that asymmetries in costs of preference or ornament with regard to exaggeration and reduction cannot fully explain the imbalance.
Rather, the bias toward exaggeration can be best explained if either the signaling efficacy or the condition dependence of a trait
increases with size. Under these circumstances, evolution always leads to more extreme exaggeration than reduction: although the
two should occur just as frequently, exaggerated secondary sexual ornaments are likely to be further removed from the naturally
selected optimum than reduced ornaments.
KEY WORDS: Handicap process, mate choice, mate preference, sexual dimorphism, sexual selection, signaling/courtship.
The existence of secondary sexual ornaments, and of sexual
preferences for them, is a theoretically well-understood phe-
nomenon, with many mathematical models showing how orna-
ment/preference evolution can arise (Mead and Arnold 2004;
Kuijper et al. 2012). However, models do not account for one
notable phenomenon: that secondary sexual ornaments generally
seem to be larger than the naturally selected optimum size, rather
than smaller. Existing models of preference/ornament evolution
generally treat reduction and exaggeration as symmetrical (Lande
1981; Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1993; van Doorn and Weissing
2006) or allow for just a single direction of trait evolution, which
could then be interpreted as being either exaggeration of the trait,
or reduction (Kirkpatrick 1982). Thus, we would expect the two
possibilities to be equally prevalent.
In some cases, there is no possibility for ornamental traits
that are reduced in size, because the naturally selected size is
to have no ornament (e.g., the ornamental leg tufts in wolf spi-
ders Schizocosa crassipes; Hebets and Uetz 2000). However, in
many other cases, mating preference is for exaggerated versions
of already-existing morphological traits, and so an ornamental
reduction in size (and/or a preference for smaller traits) would be
possible (e.g., eye-stalk length in stalk-eyed flies; Wilkinson and
Reillo 1994; Cotton et al. 2006). Despite this possibility for re-
duction, few if any species seem to exhibit reduced ornaments, or
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preferences for them (for a thorough review, see Tazzyman et al.
2014).
Under the framework of Fisher’s runaway process (Fisher
1999), the preponderance of exaggeration rather than reduction
can best be explained by the fact that the signaling efficacy of
an ornament increases with size (Tazzyman et al. 2014). The loss
of signaling efficacy in smaller traits means that runaway is pre-
vented in the direction of reduction, whereas it is still possible in
the direction of exaggeration. However, the runaway process must
in reality halt somewhere, and Fisher’s process is only one poten-
tial explanation for the evolution of secondary sexual ornamen-
tation. Another well-studied possibility is the handicap process
(Zahavi 1975). To fully explain the reasons why trait exaggera-
tion is apparently so much more common than trait reduction, and
hence to address this gap in the current theory of the evolution of
sexual signaling, we need to understand the extent to which the
handicap process also contributes to sexual trait size asymmetry.
Under the handicap process, high-quality individuals must
have higher marginal fitness benefits from advertising (Grafen
1990; Iwasa et al. 1991; Getty 1998; Holman 2012), either be-
cause for them the cost of ornament expression increases more
slowly (condition-dependent handicap), or because the benefit in
terms of mating success increases more rapidly (revealing hand-
icap) (van Doorn and Weissing 2006). We focus on condition-
dependent handicaps, and consider the costs of such traits. It is
not only the case that ornamental traits larger than the naturally
selected optimum impose a cost on their bearer; traits smaller than
the naturally selected optimum are also maladaptive, and could
thus be handicap traits. A priori, the handicap principle should
be just as likely to lead to reduced ornaments as to exagger-
ated ornaments, something born out in theoretical models (either
implicitly, e.g., Pomiankowski 1987; Iwasa et al. 1991; Iwasa
and Pomiankowski 1994; Kirkpatrick 1996; or explicitly, e.g.,
Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1995; Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1998;
van Doorn and Weissing 2006). Some additional factors must
therefore explain the disparity between exaggeration and reduc-
tion. Here we aim to investigate what these factors might be.
We consider four potential explanations: three following a
previous study of Fisher’s process (Tazzyman et al. 2014), plus an
additional one only applicable to handicap traits. First, it is likely
that as trait size increases so does signaling efficacy, because,
for example, larger traits will likely be visible to potential mates
from further away (Endler 1993; Leichty and Grier 2006; Fawcett
et al. 2007), and will be easier to compare. As mentioned above,
incorporating an increased signaling efficacy with increased or-
nament size was previously found to be a viable explanation for
the preponderance of exaggerated traits in cases where secondary
sexual ornaments and mate choice preferences evolve by Fisher’s
runaway alone (Tazzyman et al. 2014), so it seems reasonable to
investigate whether this also applies to the handicap process.
A second potential explanation is that mate choice preference
is unequal when it comes to exaggerated and reduced ornaments.
As mentioned above, exaggerated ornaments are likely to be eas-
ier to see, and consequently preference for them may impose a
smaller cost than preference for reduced ornaments. Cost of pref-
erence can be assumed to increase as the preference becomes
stronger, but perhaps the rate of this increase is greater in the
case of preferences for reduced ornamentation than in the case of
preferences for exaggerated ornamentation. If this is true, perhaps
the evolution of preference for exaggerated ornaments is favored
over the evolution of preference for reduced ornaments, because
choosy mates are able to accrue the same benefits (high-quality
mates) for a smaller cost.
A third possibility is that the costs of ornaments themselves
are different depending upon whether the ornament is exaggerated
or reduced. The element of cost for ornamental traits is crucial
to the handicap principle, and these costs will naturally increase
as an ornament deviates in size from the naturally selected opti-
mum. However, the rate of this increase may differ depending on
the direction of deviation. If this rate of increase in cost is greater
for reduced ornaments than for exaggerated ornaments, it may be
that the evolution of exaggerated ornaments is favored, as the bal-
ance point at which cost of ornament equals benefit of increased
number of matings may be more extreme in the exaggerated case.
Finally, the fourth possibility is that the degree to which an
ornament is condition dependent differs depending on whether
the ornament is exaggerated or reduced. Exaggerated ornaments
will require more resources for their production than reduced
ornaments, because they are by definition larger. Although both
types of ornament might be equally costly in terms of being not
the optimal size, the ability to accrue the required resources to
construct the ornament will also affect fitness. Because higher
viability males are likely to be able to accrue resources more
easily than lower viability individuals, condition dependence is
likely to be more pronounced in the exaggerated direction than in
the reduced direction.
In this study, we build on a classic model of the evolution
of secondary sexual ornaments and preferences by the handi-
cap process (Iwasa et al. 1991; Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994),
and incorporate each of these four potential explanations in turn
to investigate whether they are able to theoretically explain the
imbalance between exaggeration and reduction seen in the real
world.
The Model
THE BASIC PROBLEM
We follow a well-established quantitative genetic model of hand-
icap evolution. For full details of the model’s background, we
refer the interested reader to Iwasa et al. (1991) and Iwasa and
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Pomiankowski (1994). The sex that bears the sexual ornament is
called “male,” and the sex that exerts mate preference is “female,”
although the model would equally apply the other way around.
Males have two traits, ornament size s (measured on a logarith-
mic scale) and viability v. Females have two traits, viability v and
mating preference p.
The log fitness functions for males and females are, respec-
tively,
ln Wm = a[s] p¯(s − s¯) − c[s, v] + g[v], (1)
ln W f = −b[p] + g[v]. (2)
The first part on the right-hand side of (1) is a male’s fitness due to
sexual selection. If mean female preference is p¯ > 0 then males
with s-values greater than the mean s¯ benefit, whereas if p¯ < 0
males with s-values less than the mean s¯ benefit. The amount of
benefit is dependent upon the efficacy function a[s], which must
be of a form a[s] > 0 for all s. The null situation is to have a[s] as
a constant. We investigate what happens when efficacy increases
with ornament size, that is, where a[s] is an increasing function
of s.
The second part on the right-hand side of (1) is the cost of
bearing an ornament of size s given that the male is of viability
v. Costs must always be non-negative, so c[s, v] ≥ 0 for all s,
v. We define the naturally selected optimum ornament size to be
s = 0. The cost of an ornament then increases the further its size
is from s = 0. Thus for s > 0, the partial derivative ∂c/∂s > 0
(costs increase as s moves away from s = 0), whereas for s < 0,
∂c/∂s < 0 (again costs increase as s moves away from s = 0).
In a handicap model, the rate of increase of cost as ornament
size deviates from s = 0 is smaller for more viable males, so the
partial derivative
∂
∂v
(
∂c
∂s
)
< 0 for s > 0,
∂
∂v
(
∂c
∂s
)
> 0 for s < 0.
Previous models have assumed that the function c[s, v] is
symmetric, so that for a given s, v, c[s, v] = c[−s, v]. We in-
vestigate the evolutionary consequences when exaggerated or-
naments are less costly than reduced ornaments, that is, where
c[s, v] < c[−s, v].
The final part on the right-hand side of (1) is the boost to
fitness of having a higher viability v. The function g[v] is a
monotonically increasing function of v.
Equation (2) considers female fitness. The first part on the
right-hand side of (2) is the cost of having a preference. Costs must
always be non-negative, so b[p] ≥ 0. We take p = 0 to be the nat-
urally selected optimum, which corresponds to no mating prefer-
ence. Values of p greater than zero correspond to a preference for
males with ornaments larger than the population mean, whereas
values of p less than zero correspond to a preference for males
with ornaments smaller than the population mean. The greater the
magnitude |p|, the stronger the preference, and the more costly.
So for p > 0, db/dp > 0 (costs increase as p moves away from
p = 0), whereas for p < 0, db/dp < 0 (again costs increase as
p moves away from zero). Previous models have assumed that
the function b[p] is symmetric, so that b[p] = b[−p] for all p.
We investigate what happens if preference for exaggerated orna-
ments is less costly than preference for reduced ornaments, that
is, b[p] < b[−p].
DYNAMICS
We suppose that the ornament size s of a male is determined
by a trait t , which represents the condition-independent element
of ornament size, his viability v, and a further trait t ′, which
corresponds to the condition dependence of the ornament, so that
s = t + t ′v. We then track the evolution of the traits t , t ′, and p.
The dynamics of the mean traits ¯t , ¯t ′, p¯, and v¯ are given by
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
¯t
 ¯t ′
 p¯
v¯
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
1
2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Gt Bt ′ p Btp Btv
Bt ′ p Gt ′ Bt ′ p Bt ′v
Btp Bt ′ p G p Bpv
Btv Bt ′v Bpv Gv
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
βt
βt ′
βp
βv
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
−w
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (3)
The factor of 1/2 indicates the sex-limited expression of the traits.
The matrix G has entries Gi and Bi j , which are, respectively, the
additive genetic variance of i , and the additive covariance of i and
j . The selection gradients βi are given by
βt =
〈
∂
∂t
ln Wm
〉
,
βt ′ =
〈
∂
∂t ′
ln Wm
〉
,
βp =
〈
∂
∂p
ln W f
〉
,
βv =
〈
∂
∂v
(
ln Wm + ln W f
)〉
, (4)
where 〈·〉 denotes the population mean. The final term on
the right-hand side of (3) is the mutation pressure on viabil-
ity. It is supposed that mutation on viability is biased and so
reduces v.
We follow Pomiankowski and Iwasa (1993) in decomposing
the model into fast and slow dynamics. Because the mutation
bias w and the rate of increase of cost of female choice b′[p]
are both likely to be small, the system will first evolve to the
neighborhood of the quasi-equilibrium line, along which βt = 0,
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βt ′ = 0, and βv = 0. After this the slow dynamics will take over
and the system will evolve along the quasi-equilibrium line.
FAST DYNAMICS
Along the quasi-equilibrium line, βt = βt ′ = 0. From (1) and (4)
this gives
p¯ = 〈ct [s, v]〉〈a[s]〉 ,
p¯ = 〈ct ′ [s, v]〉〈a[s]v〉 , (5)
where ci [s, v] denotes the derivative of c[s, v] with respect to
i evaluated at [s, v]. Equating the two equations of (5) gives
the relations between ¯t , ¯t ′, and p¯ after the conclusion of the
fast dynamics. By making specific assumptions about the func-
tions c[s, v] and a[s], we can find explicit solutions to these
equations.
SLOW DYNAMICS
Once the system has converged to the neighborhood of the quasi-
equilibrium line, its behavior is governed by the slow dynamics.
We follow other population genetics results (Barton and Turelli
1991; Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1993; Iwasa and Pomiankowski
1994; Tazzyman et al. 2014) in calculating that along the quasi-
equilibrium line, to leading order,
 p¯ = G p
2
(−b′[ p¯] + a[s˜[ p¯]]w ˜t ′[ p¯]) , (6)
where b′[p] is the derivative of the cost function b[p] evaluated
at p, ˜t ′[ p¯] is the quasi-equilibrium value of ¯t ′ given p¯, calculated
from (5), and s˜[ p¯] is the quasi-equilibrium value of mean orna-
ment size s¯ given p¯ (see Appendix for full details). From (6) we
can calculate the equilibrium values p∗ for which  p¯ = 0.
LARGER ORNAMENTS ARE BETTER SIGNALS
Previous quantitative genetics models of sexual selection have
used a “psychophysical” approach to signaling efficacy, based on
Weber’s law, so that the ability to discern differences between
two traits is proportional to the relative sizes of the two traits
(Stevens 1975; Lande 1981). Because ornament size is measured
on a log scale, this corresponds in our model to a constant value
of a. We want to change the basic model so that a[s] is instead
an increasing function of s: the relative size differences between
ornaments are easier to discern for larger ornaments. Because we
wish to leave the other components of the model unchanged, for
b[p] and c[s, v] we follow Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1994), so
that
b[p] = b0|p|γ,
c[s, v] = c0s
2
1 + kv ,
where b0, c0, k > 0, and γ > 2. This means that as preference p
deviates from the p = 0 “no preference” case, the cost of pref-
erence increases as a power function, with exponent γ and coef-
ficient b0 > 0. This is true whether preference is for ornaments
larger than the mean (i.e., p > 0) or smaller (i.e., p < 0). As orna-
ment size s deviates from the s = 0 “no ornament” case, cost goes
up as a quadratic, with coefficient c0/(1 + kv), c0 > 0, k > 0, re-
flecting the fact that males with higher viability v will pay lower
costs for the same ornament. The parameter k thus represents the
condition dependence of the cost of the ornament.
PREFERENCE FOR SMALLER ORNAMENTS COSTS
MORE
We take a[s] = a0 > 0, a constant, as in previous models of sexual
selection, and as above take
c[s, v] = c0s
2
1 + kv .
We now alter b[p] so it is less costly for females to prefer
larger ornaments than to prefer smaller ornaments:
b[p] =
{
b0|p|γ+δ p < 0
b0b1 pγ p ≥ 0
,
for constants b0 > 0, γ > 2, 0 < b1 ≤ 1, and δ ≥ 0. Thus, as
preference deviates from the p = 0 “no preference” case in ei-
ther direction, the cost of preference increases as a power func-
tion. However, in the positive direction, the power exponent is
γ, whereas in the negative direction it is γ + δ. In addition, the
coefficient is b0b1 in the positive direction, and b0 in the negative
direction. Thus for 0 < b1 ≤ 1, and δ ≥ 0, costs of preference
increase more rapidly in the negative direction than they do in
the positive direction (as long as we do not have both b1 = 1 and
δ = 0).
SMALLER ORNAMENTS COST MORE
We set a[s] = a0 > 0 and b[p] = b0|p|γ, where b0 > 0 and
γ > 2. Then we define
c[s, v] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
c0|s|2+
1 + kv s < 0
c0cx s
2
1 + kv s ≥ 0
,
with c0 > 0, 0 < cx ≤ 1, k > 0,  ≥ 0. The costs of bearing an
ornament increase as a power function as ornament size deviates
from s = 0. However, in the positive direction the power exponent
is 2, whereas in the negative direction it is 2 + . The coefficient
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in the positive direction is c0cx/(1 + kv), whereas in the negative
direction it is c0/(1 + kv). Thus for 0 < cx ≤ 1, and  ≥ 0, orna-
mental costs increase more rapidly in the negative direction than
they do in the positive direction (assuming we do not have both
cx = 1 and  = 0).
LARGER ORNAMENTS ARE MORE CONDITION
DEPENDENT
We keep all elements of the model unchanged from the standard
form, but we replace the coefficient of condition dependence k
with a function k[s] of ornament size s. We then have a[s] = a0 >
0, b[p] = b0|p|γ, and
c[s, v] = c0s
2
1 + k[s]v . (7)
The function k[s] could take many different forms, but for mathe-
matical tractability (see Appendix) we here take k[s] to be simply
k[s] =
{
k− s < 0
k+ s ≥ 0
, (8)
where 0 < k− < k+ so that condition dependence is greater in the
exaggerated direction than in the reduced direction.
Results
Along the quasi-equilibrium line given by the fast dynamics (5),
the relationship between ¯t and ¯t ′ evolves to be fixed, so at any point
along this line we can describe ¯t ′ as a monotonically increasing
function of ¯t . To investigate the evolution of ornament size s =
t + t ′v, it is then sufficient to consider the evolutionary behavior of
¯t and p¯ along the quasi-equilibrium line. The larger the magnitude
of an equilibrium value of t∗ (or p∗), the further from the naturally
selected optimum the ornament (or preference) will evolve to be.
LARGER ORNAMENTS ARE BETTER SIGNALS
The quasi-equilibrium line (5) after the fast dynamics phase is
over is given by
p˜[¯t] = 2c0¯t
a[(1 + kv¯)¯t] (9)
(eq. (A4) in the Appendix). Then for the slow dynamics, (6)
becomes
 p¯ = G pkwt˜
2a[(1 + kv¯)t˜]γ−1
(
a[(1 + kv¯)t˜]γ − θ[t˜]γ) , (10)
(eq. (A6) in the Appendix), where
θ[t] =
(
γb0
kw
(2c0)γ−1 |t |γ−2
) 1
γ
. (11)
The equilibria are therefore ¯t = 0 (so that p¯ = 0) and any nonzero
points ¯t = t∗ for which a[(1 + kv¯)t∗] = θ[t∗] (eq. 10). There will
be exactly one negative equilibrium point t∗− < 0, which will be
stable. There may be no positive equilibria, in which case the sys-
tem will run away in a positive direction. Alternatively there may
be one or more positive equilibria, in which case the smallest of
them will be stable, denoted t∗+ > 0. If this stable positive equilib-
rium exists, then because t∗− < 0 < t∗+ and a[(1 + kv¯)¯t] is increas-
ing in ¯t , we have θ[t∗−] = a[(1 + kv¯)t∗−] < a[(1 + kv¯)t∗+] = θ[t∗+].
Then by the definition of θ[t] we know that |t∗−| < t∗+ wherever t∗+
exists (Fig. 1): the exaggerated equilibrium will be more extreme
than the reduced equilibrium.
Our results show that if the signaling efficacy of an orna-
mental trait increases with size, one of two things can occur. First,
there can be both an exaggerated and a reduced equilibrium, but
the exaggerated equilibrium is further from the naturally selected
optimum, so that exaggerated traits grow to be more extreme than
reduced traits (seen in Fig. 1 for the solid black efficacy func-
tion a1[¯t]). Second, there can be only a reduced equilibrium, but
no exaggerated equilibrium, so that reduced traits grow to some
fixed size, but exaggerated traits continue to increase in size with
every generation in a runaway (seen in Fig. 1 for the gray efficacy
function a2[¯t]). Either way, if larger ornaments are better signals
than smaller ornaments, evolution is always biased toward trait
exaggeration.
PREFERENCE FOR SMALLER ORNAMENTS COSTS
MORE
The fast dynamics proceed exactly as in Iwasa and Pomiankowski
(1994), so that we have ¯t ′ = k¯t and ¯t = a0 p¯/2c0 along the quasi-
equilibrium line. The slow dynamics phase (6) is then
 p¯ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
G p | p¯|b0(γ+δ)
2
(
| p¯|γ+δ−2 − a20 kw2b0c0(γ+δ)
)
, p < 0
G p p¯b0b1γ
2
(
a20 kw
2b0b1c0γ − p¯γ−2
)
, p ≥ 0
. (12)
The equilibrium points are p¯ = 0, p¯ = p∗−, and p¯ = p∗+, where
p∗− = −
(
a20kw
2b0c0(γ + δ)
) 1
γ+δ−2
, (13)
p∗+ =
(
a20kw
2b0b1c0γ
) 1
γ−2
. (14)
The equilibrium at the origin is unstable, whereas p∗− and p∗+ are
both stable (Appendix).
Because the equilibrium values are t∗ = a0 p∗/2c0, the sizes
of the positive and negative equilibrium ornament sizes will de-
pend on the sizes of the positive and negative equilibrium prefer-
ences. If |p∗−| < p∗+, then the exaggerated equilibrium ornament
size will be more extreme than the reduced equilibrium orna-
ment size. This is the case if δ = 0 and b1 < 1. More generally,
however, we cannot be sure which of the two equilibria has the
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Figure 1. Two examples where larger ornaments are better signals. The system evolves to the quasi-equilibrium line, alongwhich t¯′ = kt¯.
Then the average ornament size s¯ can be expressed as a function of t¯, and so we need to only consider equilibrium values of t¯. These
equilibrium values occur where θ[t¯] (dashed heavy black line) is equal to a[t¯] (eq. 10). The solid black line, denoted a1[t¯], represents a case
where there is a gradual increase in signaling efficacy as ornament size increases. There are two values for which θ[t¯] = a1[t¯], marked
t∗− and t∗+. θ[t¯] is symmetrical about t¯ = 0, and a[t¯] is increasing in t¯, so |t∗−| < t∗+. The gray line, denoted a2[t¯], represents the case where
efficacy increases more rapidly as ornament size increases. In this case there is a reduced equilibrium where θ[t¯] = a2[t¯], and the gray line
meets the dashed black line, but signaling efficacy increases so rapidly in the positive direction that the two curves do not meet, and the
system will runaway in the direction of exaggeration. In all cases, evolution toward exaggeration will lead to more extreme ornaments
than evolution toward reduction. For this example we have a[t¯] = a0 exp{ax(1 + kv¯)t¯}, and parameter values a0 = 0.4, b0 = 0.01, c0 = 0.1,
k = 0.5, γ = 3, w = 0.005, v¯ = 1, ax = 0.3 (solid black line), and ax = 1 (gray line).
greater magnitude: if the term in brackets on the right-hand side
of equation (14) has magnitude less than 1, then it is possible
that |p∗−| > p∗+, and the reduced equilibrium could be the more
extreme of the two (Fig. 2). Thus, it is not true that an increased
cost of preference for smaller ornaments necessarily results in the
exaggerated equilibrium being more extreme than the reduced
equilibrium, nor is there a possibility of runaway evolution in
either direction.
Our results show that when preference for smaller ornaments
is more costly, there will be both an exaggerated and a reduced
equilibrium, so that if evolution were to proceed in either direction
it will come to rest with some ornamental trait that differs from
the naturally selected optimum size, and a related preference.
However, we cannot say that exaggerated traits are likely to be
more extreme than reduced traits, because the exact details of the
two equilibria will depend upon parameter values (Fig. 2).
SMALLER ORNAMENTS COST MORE
After some calculation (see Appendix for details) we obtain the
quasi-equilibrium line
p˜[¯t] =
⎧⎨
⎩
− (2+)c0(1+)1+(1+kv)
a0(1+(1+kv))1+ |¯t |1+, p < 0
2c0cx
a0
¯t, p ≥ 0
.
The slow dynamics (6) are then
 p¯ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
G pφγb0|¯t |
2aγ−10 (1+(1+kv¯))
(
|¯t |(1+)(γ−1)−1 − a
γ
0 kw
φγb0
)
, p < 0
G pγb0¯t(2c0cx )γ−1
2aγ−10
(
a
γ
0 kw
(2c0cx )γ−1γb0 − ¯tγ−2
)
, p ≥ 0
,
where
φ =
((1 + )1+(2 + )c0(1 + kv¯))γ−1
(1 + (1 + kv¯))(1+)(γ−1)−1
(see Appendix). The equilibrium points are ¯t = 0, ¯t = t∗−, and
¯t = t∗+, where
t∗− = −
∣∣∣∣∣
(
a
γ
0 kw
γb0φ
) 1(1+)(γ−1)−1 ∣∣∣∣∣ , (15)
t∗+ =
(
a
γ
0 kw
(2c0cx )γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
. (16)
The origin is unstable, whereas t∗+ and t∗− are stable (Appendix). If
 = 0 and cx < 1, then t∗+ > |t∗−|, and the exaggerated equilibrium
ornament size will be more extreme than the reduced equilibrium
ornament size (Appendix). More generally, however, we cannot
be sure which of the two equilibria will be the more extreme: if
the terms in brackets on the right-hand sides of equations (15) and
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Figure 2. The casewhere preference for reduced ornaments costs
more can lead to both exaggeration and to reduction, depending
on parameter values. The curves show the value |p∗−| = p∗+, from
equations (13) and (14), for different combinations of b1 and δ.
The four curves show the cases where the combined parameters
a20kw/2b0c0 = 0.5, 1,1.5, and 2, from the lowest to the highest.
The area above each curve is the region in which |p∗−| > p∗+, so
that the magnitude of the reduced preference is greater than that
of the exaggerated preference. The area below each curve is the
region in which |p∗−| < p∗+, so that the magnitude of the reduced
preference is less than that of the exaggerated preference. The
other parameter γ = 3.
(16) both have magnitude less than 1, it is possible that t∗+ < |t∗−|,
so that the reduced equilibrium is the more extreme of the two
(Fig. 3). Thus it is not true that an increase cost of smaller or-
naments necessarily results in the exaggerated equilibrium being
more extreme than the reduced equilibrium, nor is there a possi-
bility of runaway evolution in either direction.
Similar to the case above for costs of preference, our results
show that when smaller ornaments are more costly, there will
be both an exaggerated and a reduced equilibrium, so that if
evolution were to proceed in either direction it will come to rest
with some ornamental trait that differs from the naturally selected
optimum size, and a related preference. However, we cannot say
that exaggerated traits are likely to be more extreme than reduced
traits, because the exact details of the two equilibria will depend
upon parameter values (Fig. 3).
LARGER ORNAMENTS ARE MORE CONDITION
DEPENDENT
Finally, we can consider the case where smaller ornaments are less
condition-dependent than larger ornaments, following equations
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
∋
c
x
Reduction
Exaggeration
Figure 3. The case where smaller ornaments cost more can lead
to both exaggeration and to reduction, depending on parameter
values. The curves show the value |t∗−| = t∗+, from equations (15)
and (16), for different combinations of cx and . The four curves
show the cases where γ = 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, from the low-
est to the highest. The area above each curve is the region in
which |t∗−| > t∗+, so that the magnitude of the reduced ornament is
greater than that of the exaggerated ornament. The area below
each curve is the region in which |t∗−| < t∗+, so that the magnitude
of the reduced ornament is less than that of the exaggerated orna-
ment. The other parameters a0 = 0.2, b0 = 0.0004, c0 = 0.09, k =
0.5,w = 0.003, v¯ = 0.5.
(7) and (8). After some calculation (see Appendix for details), we
get the quasi-equilibrium lines ¯t ′ = k−¯t for ¯t < 0, and ¯t ′ = k+¯t
for ¯t ≥ 0, giving p˜[¯t] = 2c0¯t/a0 in both cases. The slow dynamics
(6) are then
 p¯ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γb0
(
2c0|¯t |
a0
)γ−1
− a0k−w |¯t | p¯ < 0
−γb0
(
2c0¯t
a0
)γ−1
+ a0k+w¯t p¯ ≥ 0
.
The equilibrium points are then ¯t = 0, ¯t = t∗−, and ¯t = t∗+, where
t∗− = −
∣∣∣∣∣
(
a
γ
0 k−w
(2c0)γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
t∗+ =
(
a
γ
0 k+w
(2c0)γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
,
(see Appendix) and because k− < k+ we have |t∗−| < t∗+. The
origin is unstable, whereas t∗+ and t∗− are stable.
Our results show that if condition dependence is greater in
the direction of exaggeration than in the direction of reduction, we
always have two equilibria: one in the direction of exaggeration,
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and one in the direction of reduction. The exaggerated equilibrium
is further from the naturally selected optimum than the reduced
equilibrium, so that exaggerated traits will grow to be more ex-
treme than reduced traits.
Discussion
Previous models of the evolution of secondary sexual ornaments
have presumed a symmetry between exaggerated and reduced
traits, whereas in nature this symmetry is notably absent, with
exaggerated traits apparently much more frequent than reduced
traits (Ryan and Keddy-Hector 1992; Tazzyman et al. 2014). We
used a quantitative genetics approach, adapting a classic model
(Iwasa et al. 1991; Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994) to incorporate
four different possible explanations for this asymmetry when sec-
ondary sexual ornaments evolve via the handicap process (Zahavi
1975).
The first explanation was that signaling efficacy is an in-
creasing function of trait size. This is biologically reasonable,
because exaggerated traits are likely to be more easily visible by
would-be mates, and may also be more reliable as signals. We
showed that adding this signaling efficacy asymmetry to existing
models (Iwasa et al. 1991; Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994) means
that exaggeration will produce more extreme ornamentation than
reduction (i.e., ornaments further from the naturally selected op-
timum). The fact that signaling efficacy increases with trait size is
potentially sufficient to explain the imbalance between exaggera-
tion and reduction seen in the real world. When secondary sexual
ornaments evolve to be reduced in size, they incur increased cost
and decreased efficacy as they diverge from the naturally selected
optimum. When they evolve to be increased in size, they incur
increased cost but also gain increased efficacy as they diverge
from the naturally selected optimum. Consequently, the equilib-
rium ornament size is further removed from the naturally selected
optimum in the exaggerated case than in the reduced case. In-
deed, if the gain in efficacy is greater than the increased cost as
ornaments become larger, runaway occurs in the direction of trait
exaggeration. Such a runaway cannot occur in the direction of
trait reduction.
The second potential explanation was to do with the cost of
female preference. In particular, we investigated the case where
the rate of increase of cost as female preference becomes stronger
is greater in the reduced direction than in the exaggerated di-
rection: for a given strength of preference, females who prefer
reduced males pay a higher cost than females who prefer exag-
gerated males. Biologically this explanation again seems plau-
sible: assessing reduced ornaments is likely to be harder than
assessing exaggerated ornaments. However, support for this ex-
planation was equivocal: whereas for some parameter values this
framework results in the equilibrium for exaggerated ornamen-
tation being more extreme than that for reduced ornamentation,
this is not necessarily the case for all parameter values. For some
parameter combinations the reverse is true, with reduced orna-
mentation being the more extreme of the two (Fig. 2). In addition,
under this framework runaway evolution is impossible in either
direction (using the functions we investigated above).
The third potential explanation was to do with the cost of
the secondary sexual ornament. We investigated the case where
the rate of increase of cost as a trait deviates from the naturally
selected optimum is greater in the reduced direction than it is in
the exaggerated direction: for a given deviation from the natu-
rally selected optimum, a reduced trait will be more costly than
an exaggerated trait. Biologically this is difficult to justify: a pri-
ori it seems feasible that the reverse would be true, because all
else being equal the resources needed to construct an exaggerated
ornament are by definition greater than the resources needed to
construct a reduced ornament. However, it could still potentially
be true at least in some cases. Again, however, the theoretical
support for this possibility provided by our model was equivocal.
For some parameter values, the equilibrium point for exaggerated
ornamentation is further from the naturally selected optimum than
the equilibrium for reduced ornamentation, meaning that exagger-
ated ornamentation is more extreme than reduced. However, for
other parameter values the reverse is true, and reduced ornamen-
tation is the more extreme (Fig. 3). In addition, runaway evolution
is impossible in either direction under this framework (using the
functions we investigated above).
The final possibility we investigated was that the condition
dependence of the ornament, which is crucial for the ornament
to be a handicap trait, differed between exaggerated and reduced
traits. We supposed that exaggerated traits were more condition
dependent than reduced traits. Biologically this is plausible on
the grounds that exaggerated traits are likely to require more re-
sources to grow and maintain, and consequently are likely to be
harder for low-condition males to attain. Reduced traits, on the
other hand, whereas also being costly due to their suboptimal size,
require fewer resources to grow, and so may be more attainable
for low-condition males. In the simple case where condition de-
pendence is fixed for both exaggerated and reduced traits, and is
greater in the former than in the latter, exaggeration will produce
more extreme ornaments than reduction. To see why, note that or-
naments with greater condition dependence provide females with
more information, and consequently females gain greater bene-
fits from preferences for exaggerated traits. Therefore the point at
which the cost of preference balances the benefit of mating with a
male in good condition will be at a more extreme preference level
in the exaggerated case than in the reduced case. This provides
a second potential explanation for the preponderance of exagger-
ated traits in the real world. If ornaments largely evolve through
the handicap process, and condition dependence is greater for
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exaggerated traits than for reduced traits, then exaggerated traits
will be more extreme than reduced traits. However, we stress that
we have only investigated this case for a simple characterization
of condition dependence. Although it is often assumed that the
exaggerated size of secondary sexual ornaments implies that they
are more condition dependent, in fact this is not certain (Cotton
et al. 2006), and the condition dependence of a sexual ornament
at equilibrium will depend on the exact form of the cost function
(Johnstone et al. 2009). We have shown for a simple cost function
that evolution is likely to favor more extreme traits in the direction
of increased condition dependence. It would be worthwhile to in-
vestigate the case for more complicated cost regimes, and also
to establish whether exaggeration is necessarily more condition
dependent than reduction.
We have previously shown that where a trait evolves purely
through the Fisher process, the most likely explanation for the pre-
ponderance of exaggerated traits is that the efficacy of a signaling
trait is likely to increase as the trait increases in size (Tazzyman
et al. 2014). This result is echoed here for the handicap process,
with signaling efficacy again a potential reason for the observed
fact that secondary sexual traits are generally more exaggerated
than reduced. We have also shown that condition dependence
might play a role. Support for signaling efficacy and for condition
dependence is strong because these two explanations alone will
always bias the system in favor of exaggeration and against reduc-
tion. Our work here does not rule out the other two explanations
(increased costs of preference or trait in the reduced direction),
which could also provide the kind of asymmetry required. But
in this case, bias toward exaggerated trait values is dependent
upon a restricted set of parameter values. Similarly, our previous
work on the Fisher process showed that only signaling efficacy
necessarily provided the asymmetry required, but an increased
cost of trait in the reduced direction could have also provided an
explanation for a restricted set of parameter values (Tazzyman
et al. 2014). For the handicap process, we are able to suggest that
traits will generally evolve in the direction of increased signaling
efficacy and/or in the direction of increased information content
(i.e., increased condition dependence), but this tendency could be
affected by asymmetries in costs of signal or preference.
The explanations here need not be mutually exclusive; it
is easy to believe, for example, that exaggerated ornaments are
simultaneously more efficacious as signals and less costly for fe-
males to prefer. The effects of this are difficult to assess, because
the models above are technically difficult to analyze, particularly
for the two explanations that feature asymmetrical costs. We sus-
pect that because the results are so simple and clear in the cases of
increased signaling efficacy and increased condition dependence,
they would likely carry over to more complicated scenarios in
which there were multiple asymmetries acting simultaneously (as
is probably likely in reality).
Our work can be seen as being relevant to ideas about sen-
sory bias and secondary sexual ornament evolution, because it is
possible to conceive of the direction of sensory bias being that in
which signal efficacy increases with ornament size. Although we
do not show that signaling traits are more likely to evolve toward
greater signaling efficacy (Endler et al. 2005), we do show that
if they do evolve in this direction, they will likely become more
exaggerated.
It is notable that our model still results in symmetry be-
tween exaggerated and reduced secondary sexual ornaments in
the sense that a system starting at the origin (no preference) is
equally likely to evolve in the exaggerated or the reduced direc-
tion. The only differences are the magnitude of the equilibrium
that the system reaches differs depending on in which direction
evolution proceeds, and that runaway evolution can only ever
occur in the exaggerated direction. Our work, just like other theo-
retical models of sexual ornament and preference evolution, does
not suggest that exaggerated traits should evolve more frequently
than reduced traits (Mead and Arnold 2004; Kuijper et al. 2012;
Tazzyman et al. 2014). This leads to the prediction that there
are equally as many reduced ornaments as exaggerated orna-
ments in the real world. In reality, however, very few examples
are known of reduced secondary sexual ornaments. Possible ex-
amples are the golden-headed cisticola Cisticola exilis (Balm-
ford et al. 2000), and the fairy wren Malurus melanocephalus
(Karubian et al. 2009), but there are problems in both cases, and
few other possibilities (Tazzyman et al. 2014). This may be due
to reporting bias. Because of the effects of signaling efficacy in-
creasing with ornament size, reduced ornaments might be harder
to observe because they are similar in size to the naturally se-
lected optimum. The exaggerated ornaments, on the other hand,
are more extreme, and so are noticed. It may be that if reduced
ornaments are carefully looked for, they will be found to be as fre-
quent as exaggerated ornaments. On the other hand, there may still
be something missing in the theory of ornament and preference
evolution.
A possible answer to this lack of reduced ornamental traits
could be found by looking at a nonequilibrium dynamical model
of ornament-preference evolution. Previous models have shown
that in some cases equilibria for trait and preference do not ex-
ist, for example, because of the costs of preference (Iwasa and
Pomiankowski 1995; Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1998), the ex-
haustion of good genes variation due to extreme ornamentation
(Houle and Kondrashov 2002), or conflict over the information
content of ornamental signals (van Doorn and Weissing 2006).
In these cases continual evolution occurs, with traits and pref-
erences cycling in complicated ways depending upon parameter
values. Some of these models (Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1995;
Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1998; van Doorn and Weissing 2006)
explicitly feature negative values of preference and ornament, and
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the resulting evolutionary trajectories cycle through this negative
portion of evolutionary space just as frequently as through the
positive portion, meaning existing nonequilibrium models also
predict that reduced and exaggerated traits (and the preferences
for them) should be equally frequent. We suggest that a logical
next step in the investigation of the lack of reduced ornamental
traits would be to see what effect asymmetries in cost of ornament,
cost of preference, condition dependence, and signaling efficacy,
have on nonequilibrium models.
In conclusion, we have shown that the preponderance of
exaggerated traits seen in nature could be at least partly explained
by our finding that secondary sexual ornaments are likely to reach
a more extreme equilibrium when they evolve via the handicap
process in the direction of increased signaling efficacy (which
we have previously shown to also be true for Fisher’s process,
Tazzyman et al. 2014), or the direction of increased condition
dependence. However, in the case of the handicap process, these
explanations also lead to the further prediction that there are in
fact just as many reduced traits as exaggerated traits, but they are
closer in size to the naturally selected optimum. Therefore, we
suggest that further work is needed before it can be concluded
that this problem has been fully solved.
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Appendix
GENERAL SLOW DYNAMICS
The method we follow is taken from Iwasa and
Pomiankowski (1994, Appendix). We go through it very
briefly here. Following the conclusion of the fast dynamics, ¯t , ¯t ′,
and v¯ are somewhere near quasi-equilibrium values that depend
on the value of p¯. We define these positions t˜[ p¯], ˜t ′[ p¯], and v˜[ p¯],
respectively. Equation (3) then becomes
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
d˜t
d p¯ + τ dz1[ p¯]d p¯
d ˜t ′
d p¯ + τ dz2[ p¯]d p¯
1
d v˜
d p¯ + τ dz3[ p¯]d p¯
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
 p¯ = 1
2
G
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
βt
βt ′
βp
βv
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
−w
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
where z1[·], z2[·], and z3[·] are functions, and τ a small constant,
which describe the small deviation of the system from the quasi-
equilibrium surface. We can left-multiply by the inverse matrix
G−1 and concentrate on the evolution of p¯ to give
((
G−1
)
pt
dt˜
d p¯
+ (G−1)pt ′ d ˜t ′d p¯ +
(
G−1
)
pp +
(
G−1
)
pv
d v˜
d p¯
)
 p¯ = 1
2
βp[ p¯] − w
(
G−1
)
pv ,
substituting in for βp, we can rewrite this expression to first order
as
 p¯
G p
= −b
′[ p¯]
2
− w (G−1)pv , (A1)
where
(
G−1
)
pv =
−1
|G|
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gt Btt ′ Btv
Btt ′ Gt ′ Bt ′v
Btp Bt ′ p Bpv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We perform a Taylor expansion of s = t + t ′v around s¯, ¯t , ¯t ′,
and v¯, ignoring higher order terms, and get the result s = t +
v¯t ′ + ¯t ′v, where i = ¯i − i for all terms i . This gives us
Bts = Gt + v¯Btt ′ + ¯t ′ Btv,
Bt ′s = Btt ′ + v¯Gt ′ + ¯t ′ Bt ′v,
Bvs = Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv.
Because we are assuming females choose mates based on s, the
size of the ornament, genetic correlations Btp, Bt ′ p, and Bpv come
about through correlations of t , t ′, and v with s. In addition, we
have that the genetic correlation between s and p, Bps comes about
through preference, and is equal to Bps = a[s¯]G pGs/2 (Barton
and Turelli 1991; Pomiankowski and Iwasa 1993; Tazzyman et al.
2014). So
Btp = BpsGs Bts =
a[s¯]G p
2
(
Gt + v¯Btt ′ + ¯t ′ Btv
)
,
Bt ′ p = BpsGs Bt ′s =
a[s¯]G p
2
(
Btt ′ + v¯Gt ′ + ¯t ′ Bt ′v
)
,
Bpv = BpsGs Bvs =
a[s¯]G p
2
(
Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv
)
,
giving
(
G−1
)
pv =
−a[s¯]G p
2|G| ×⎛
⎜⎝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gt Btt ′ Btv
Btt ′ Gt ′ Bt ′v
Gt Btt ′ Btv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ v¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gt Btt ′ Btv
Btt ′ Gt ′ Bt ′v
Btt ′ Gt ′ Bt ′v
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ¯t
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gt Btt ′ Btv
Btt ′ Gt ′ Bt ′v
Btv Bt ′v Gv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
or, to leading order,
(
G−1
)
pv =
−a[s¯] ¯t ′
2
,
so that equation (A1) becomes
 p¯ = G p
2
(−b′[ p¯] + a[s¯]w ¯t ′) ,
as given in the main text.
LARGER ORNAMENTS ARE BETTER SIGNALS
Fast dynamics
Equations (5) become
〈a[s]〉 p¯
2c0
= 〈ψ〉, (A2)
〈a[s]v〉 p¯
2c0
= 〈vψ〉, (A3)
where ψ = (t + t ′v)/(1 + kv). We perform a Taylor expansion of
ψ around t = ¯t , t ′ = ¯t ′, v = v¯, giving
ψ = ¯t +
¯t ′v¯
1 + kv¯ +
1
1 + kv¯ t +
v¯
1 + kv¯ t
′ +
¯t ′ − k¯t
(1 + kv¯)2 v
− k(1 + kv¯)2 tv +
1
(1 + kv¯)2 t
′v − k
(
¯t ′ − k¯t)
(1 + kv¯)3 v
2
+ · · · ,
where t = t − ¯t , t ′ = t ′ − ¯t ′, and v = v − v¯. Then, assum-
ing we can ignore higher order terms, we get
〈ψ〉 ≈ ¯t +
¯t ′v¯
1 + kv¯ −
k
(1 + kv¯)2 Btv +
1
(1 + kv¯)2 Bt ′v
−k
(
¯t ′ − k¯t)
(1 + kv¯)3 Gv,
〈vψ〉 = 〈(v¯ + v)ψ〉 ≈ v¯〈ψ〉 + 1
1 + kv¯ Btv +
v¯
1 + kv¯ Bt ′v
+
¯t ′ − k¯t
(1 + kv¯)2 Gv.
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Because s = t + t ′v, we can also use a Taylor expansion of
a[s] around t = ¯t , t ′ = ¯t ′, v = v¯ to get
a[s] = a[s¯] + a′[s¯] (t + v¯t ′ + ¯t ′v + t ′v)
+higher order terms,
where a′[s] denotes the first derivative of a[s] with respect to
s, and s¯ = 〈t + t ′v〉, the population average ornament size. We
suppose that a[s] is increasing in s, but it is locally nearly linear,
so that for all s we can ignore a′′[s] or higher derivatives. Then
〈a[s]〉 ≈ a[s¯] + a′[s¯]Bt ′v,
〈a[s]v〉 = 〈a[s](v¯ + v)〉 ≈ 〈a[s]〉v¯ + a′[s¯]
× (Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv) .
Equation (A3) can then be rewritten as
〈a[s]〉v¯ p¯
2c0
+ a
′[s¯] (Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv) p¯
2c0
= v¯〈ψ〉 + 1
1 + kv¯ Btv +
v¯
1 + kv¯ Bt ′v +
¯t ′ − k¯t
(1 + kv¯)2 Gv,
so from equation (A2),
a′[s¯] (Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv) p¯
2c0
= 1
1 + kv¯ Btv +
v¯
1 + kv¯ Bt ′v
+
¯t ′ − k¯t
(1 + kv¯)2 Gv.
We suppose Btv and Bt ′v are small compared to other terms
(Barton and Turelli 1991; Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994), and
after some rearrangement we then have, to leading order,
¯t ′ = 2c0k¯t
2c0 − (1 + kv¯)2 p¯a′[s¯] .
If we suppose that a′[s¯] is of small order relative to c0, then we
get ¯t ′ ≈ k¯t , and a quasi-equilibrium line that can be expressed
p˜[¯t] ≈ 2c0¯t
α[¯t] , (A4)
where α[¯t] = a[(1 + kv¯)¯t]. This is equation (9) in the text. We
note that p˜[¯t] = 0 if and only if ¯t = 0. Additionally, we note that
d p˜
d¯t
= 2c0(α[¯t] − ¯tα
′[¯t])
α[¯t]2 ,
where α′[t] is the derivative of α[t] with respect to t . If we suppose
that α[t] is such that the numerator is always positive (so that
p˜[¯t] is always increasing in ¯t), then we can say that the quasi-
equilibrium line is also expressible as a function of p¯, t˜[ p¯], and
that along this line,
dt˜
d p¯
= α[t˜]
2
2c0(α[t˜] − t˜α′[t˜]) . (A5)
Equilibria
Equation (6) becomes
 p¯ = G p
2
(−b′[ p¯] + a[s˜[ p¯]]w ˜t ′[ p¯]) ,
=
{
G p
2
(
b0γ| p¯|γ−1 − α[t˜]kw|t˜ |
)
p¯ < 0
G p
2
(−b0γ p¯γ−1 + α[t˜]kwt˜) p¯ ≥ 0
=
{
G p
2
(
2γ−1b0cγ−10 γ
α[t˜]γ−1 |t˜ |γ−1 − α[t˜]kw|t˜ |
)
t˜ < 0
G p
2
(−b0γ p¯γ−1 + α[t˜]kwt˜) t˜ ≥ 0
= G pt˜
2α[t˜]γ−1kw
(
α[t˜]γ − 2
γ−1b0cγ−10 γ|t˜ |γ−2
kw
)
. (A6)
The equilibria are at ¯t = 0, and any points where α[t] = θ[t] (eq.
11).
Case: t¯ = 0
At quasi-equilibrium, we have ˜t ′[ p¯] = kt˜[ p¯] and s˜[ p¯, v¯] =
t˜[ p¯] + ˜t ′[ p¯]v¯ = (1 + kv¯)t˜[ p¯]. Then equation (6) becomes
 p¯ = G p
2
(−b′[ p¯] + kwα[t˜[ p¯]]t˜[ p¯]) .
By the chain rule,
d
d p¯
(
α[t˜[ p¯]]) = d
dt˜
(
α[t˜[ p¯]]) dt˜
d p¯
= α′[t˜[ p¯]] dt˜
d p¯
.
Thus we can differentiate our expression for  p¯ to get
d p¯
d p¯
= G p
2
(
−b′′[ p¯] + kw dt˜
d p¯
(
α′[t˜[ p¯]]t˜[ p¯] + α[t˜[ p¯]])) .
From equation (A5) above we have that dt˜/d p¯ evaluated at p¯ = 0
is α[0]/2c0, so evaluating d p¯/d p¯ at p¯ = 0 gives d p¯/d p¯ =
α[0]2G pkw/4c0 > 0, so the equilibrium at the origin is unstable.
Case: t < 0
From equation (11), θ[0] = 0 < a[0], and θ[t] is strictly de-
creasing for t < 0, and is unbounded above. Because a[t] is
strictly increasing, it follows that there is exactly one t∗− < 0
such that a[t∗−] = θ[t∗−] (Fig. 1 shows an example). Also, for
all t∗− < t < 0, a[t] > θ[t], so from (10),  p¯ < 0, whereas for
t < t∗− < 0,  p¯ > 0, so t∗− is stable.
Case: t > 0
We suppose for simplicity that there is no continuous subset
[ta, tb] ⊂ R+ so that a[t] = θ[t] for all t ∈ [ta, tb] (our analy-
sis extends to this case, but for simplicity we omit it here). Then
there are two possibilities. Either a[t] ≥ θ[t] for all t > 0, so that
there are no stable equilibria, and positive runaway occurs. Alter-
natively, there exists some value τ > 0 such that a[τ] < θ[τ], and
consequently by continuity there is some t∗+, 0 < t∗+ < τ, such
that a[t∗+] = θ[t∗+], and t∗+ is stable.
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SPECIAL CASE OF VARYING a WHEN γ = 2
Supposing that b′[p] = 2b0 p, we know from Iwasa and
Pomiankowski (1994) that
 p¯ = G p
2
(−2b0 p¯ + α[t˜[ p¯]]kwt˜) ,
so  p¯ = 0 when b′[ p¯] = α[t˜[ p¯]]kwt , and also
d ( p¯)
dp
= G p
2
(
−2b0 + kw dt˜d p¯
(
α[t˜] + t˜α′[t˜]))
= G p
2
(
kwα[t˜]2 (α[t˜] + t˜α′[t˜])− 4b0c0 (α[t˜] − t˜α′[t˜])
2c0
(
α[t˜] − t˜α′[t˜])
)
(A7)
from equation (A5). Using (A4) gives us that  p¯ = 0 when
α[t˜]2 t˜ = 4b0c0
kw
t˜,
and this has solutions at t˜ = 0 and t˜ = t∗, defined by
α[t∗] = 2
√
4b0c0
kw
.
If such a t∗ exists, it must be unique, because α[t] = a[(1 + kv¯)t]
is monotonic and increasing.
Consider the solution t˜ = 0. From above we know that this
means p¯ = 0. Equation (A7) then gives that
d ( p¯)
d p¯
∣∣∣∣
p¯=0
= G p
4c0
(
kwα[0]2 − 4b0c0
)
, (A8)
and from (A5) we have that at t˜ = 0, dt˜/d p¯ = α[0]/2c0. Then
equation (A8) is negative if the term in brackets on the right-hand
side is negative, which is true if
a[0] < 2
√
b0c0
kw
. (A9)
Consequently, if the signaling efficacy a[0] of the trait at the nat-
urally selected optimum is below a threshold value 2
√
b0c0/kw,
the origin is stable and no sexual signaling will evolve. Because
a[t] is monotonically increasing in t , we also know that if a solu-
tion t∗ = 0 exists, then we have t∗ > 0 if and only if the origin is
stable, and t∗ < 0 if and only if the origin is unstable.
Now consider the solution t˜ = t∗, assuming that it exists.
Equations (A5) and (A7) give
d ( p¯)
d p¯
∣∣∣∣
p¯= p˜[t∗]
= 2b0c0G pt
∗α′[t∗]
c0 (α[t∗] − t∗α′[t∗]) , (A10)
and because we are assuming a[(1 + kv¯)t] > ta′[(1 + kv¯)t] for
all t , (A10) has the same sign as t∗. Therefore if t∗ < 0, then it is
stable, and if t∗ > 0, then it is unstable.
Thus, supposing that the system starts at the origin, we have
the following two possibilities: (1) Stable origin. There may be an
unstable equilibrium point for some t∗ > 0. If the system is driven
past this point (e.g., by stochastic fluctuations) then it will run
away in the direction of exaggeration. Otherwise no signaling will
evolve. (2) Unstable origin. The system runs away from the origin
in either direction. There may be a stable equilibrium point t∗ < 0,
in which case evolution toward reduced ornamentation will stop
at that point. Evolution toward exaggerated ornamentation will
runaway indefinitely. Figure A1 shows the two possibilities.
PREFERENCE FOR SMALLER ORNAMENTS COSTS
MORE
At quasi-equilibrium, (6) becomes
 p¯ = G p
2
(−b′[ p¯] + a0kwt˜[ p¯]) .
=
⎧⎨
⎩
G p
2
(
b0(γ + δ) | p¯|γ+δ−1 + a0kw¯t
)
p < 0
G p
2
(−b0b1γ p¯γ−1 + a0kw¯t) p ≥ 0
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
G pb0(γ+δ)| p¯|
2
(
| p¯|γ+δ−2 − a20 kw2b0c0(γ+δ)
)
p < 0
G pb0b1γ p¯
2
(
a20 kw
2b0b1c0γ − p¯γ−2
)
p ≥ 0
,
with equilibria given as in the main text. We wish to determine
the stability of these equilibria.
Case: p¯ = 0
From above,
d ( p¯)
d p¯
∣∣∣∣
p¯=0
= G pa
2
0kw
4c0
> 0,
so the origin is unstable.
Case: p¯ = p∗−
From (12), for p¯ such that p∗− < p¯ < 0,  p¯ < 0, whereas for p¯
such that p¯ < p∗−,  p¯ > 0, so p∗− is a stable equilibrium.
Case: p¯ = p∗+
From (12), for p¯ such that 0 < p¯ < p∗+,  p¯ > 0, whereas for p¯
such that p∗+ < p¯,  p¯ < 0, so p∗+ is a stable equilibrium.
SMALLER ORNAMENTS COST MORE
Fast dynamics
Denote by c1[s, v] the derivative of c[s, v] with respect to the first
argument, and by c2[s, v] the derivative with respect to the second
argument. Then multiple derivatives will be denoted ci jk[s, v] for
values i , j , k. We denote the derivatives of c[t + t ′v, v] with
respect to t , t ′, and v by ct [t + t ′v, v], ct ′ [t + t ′v, v], and cv[t +
t ′v, v], respectively. We will again denote multiple derivatives
with multiple subscripts. Because s = t + t ′v, we have
ct = c1
ct ′ = vc1
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No preference Exaggeration Reduction 
a[0] < 2 b0c0
kw
Origin stable, 
a[0] > 2 b0c0
kw
Origin unstable, 
No preference Exaggeration Reduction 
Figure A1. Two possibilities for the system when signaling efficacy is an increasing function of signal size, and γ = 2. For both, the
central point is marked as “no preference” and shows the equilibrium where there is no preference, and the ornamental trait remains at
the naturally selected optimum. Ornamental exaggeration is toward the right, ornamental reduction toward the left. The first line shows
the situation when the signaling efficacy at the naturally selected optimum is below the threshold given by equation (A9). The origin is
stable (marked by a filled circle), and secondary sexual signaling does not evolve unless some stochastic fluctuation pushes the system
to the right of the unstable equilibrium (marked by the empty circle). The second line shows the situation when the signaling efficacy at
the naturally selected optimum is above the threshold given by equation (A9). The origin becomes unstable (marked by an empty circle).
The system either runs away toward exaggeration (to the right), or evolves to the reduced equilibrium (marked by the filled circle). If the
signaling efficacy at the naturally selected optimum equals the threshold then the only equilibrium will be at the origin. It will be stable
to perturbations toward ornamental reduction, but will run away toward exaggeration.
ctt = c11
ctt ′ = vc11
ctv = t ′c11 + c12. (A11)
Equations (5) give
a0 p¯ =
〈
ct [t + t ′v, v]
〉
, (A12)
a0v¯ p¯ =
〈
vct [t + t ′v, v]
〉
. (A13)
Then we can take a Taylor series of ct around t = ¯t , t ′ = ¯t ′, and
v = v¯ to give
ct [t + t ′v, v] = c¯t + t c¯t t + t ′c¯t t ′ + vc¯tv + tt ′c¯t t t ′
+tvc¯t tv + t ′vc¯t t ′v + 12t
2c¯t t t
+1
2
v2c¯tvv + 12t
′2c¯t t ′t ′ + higher order terms,
where c¯I = cI [¯t + ¯t ′v¯, v¯] for all the possible I listed. We can then
use equation (A11) to get
〈vct 〉 = 〈(v¯ + v)ct 〉
= v¯ 〈ct 〉 + 〈vct 〉
= v¯ 〈ct 〉 + c¯11(Btv + v¯Bt ′v + ¯t ′Gv) + c¯12Gv.
Substituting this, and equation (A12) into equation (A13), and
disregarding terms Bi j as being of much smaller order than Gv ,
we get that at quasi-equilibrium
c¯11 ¯t ′ + c¯12 ≈ 0. (A14)
Thus, from our definition of c[s, v] in the text above, we
have
c11[s, v] =
⎧⎨
⎩
c0|s|(1+)(2+)
1+kv s < 0
2c0cx
1+kv s ≥ 0
,
c12[s, v] =
⎧⎨
⎩
c0k|s|1+(2+)
(1+kv)2 s < 0
− 2c0cx ks(1+kv)2 s ≥ 0
.
Denote s˜ = ¯t + ¯t ′v¯, so that c¯I = cI [s˜, v¯]. Then, for s˜ < 0,
(2 + )(1 + )c0|s˜| ¯t ′
1 + kv¯ = −
(2 + )c0k|s˜|1+
(1 + kv¯)2 ,
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which gives that on the quasi-equilibrium line, ¯t ′ = k¯t/(1 + (1 +
kv¯)). For s˜ ≥ 0, however,
2c0cx ¯t ′
1 + kv¯ =
2c0cx ks˜
(1 + kv¯)2 ,
so that ¯t ′ = k¯t . Then because ctvv[t + t ′v, v] = c122 + 2 ¯t ′c112 +
¯t ′2c111, cttt = c111, and ctt ′t ′ = v¯2c111, we have from above, to
leading order,
a0 p¯ = 〈ct [t + t ′v, v]〉 = c¯1 + c¯1112
(
Gt + v¯2Gt ′ + ¯t ′2Gv
)
+ c¯122
2
Gv + c¯112 ¯t ′Gv.
Then we can again use the expression of c[t + t ′v, v] from the
main text to calculate c111, c112, and c122 as
c111[s, v] =
⎧⎨
⎩
− c0|s|−1(1+)(2+)1+kv s < 0
0 s ≥ 0
,
c112[s, v] =
⎧⎨
⎩
− c0k|s|(1+)(2+)(1+kv)2 s < 0
− 2c0cx k(1+kv)2 s ≥ 0
,
c122[s, v] =
⎧⎨
⎩
− 2c0k2|s|1+(2+)(1+kv)3 s < 0
4c0cx k2s
(1+kv)3 s ≥ 0
.
Then for s˜ < 0, we get
a0 p¯ = −(2 + )c0|s˜|
1+
1 + kv¯ −
1
2
(
Gt + v¯2Gt ′ + ¯t ′2Gv
)
× (1 + )(2 + )c0|s˜|
−1
1 + kv −
Gv
2
(
2(2 + )cok2|s˜|+1
(1 + kv)3
+2
¯t ′(1 + )(2 + )cok|s˜|
(1 + kv)2
)
.
Suppose that  is small, so that we can neglect the (Gt + v¯2Gt ′ +
¯t ′2Gv) term. Then, to leading order,
a0 p¯ = −(2 + )c0|s˜|
1+
1 + kv¯ − Gv
( (2 + )c0k|s˜|
(1 + kv)2
)
×
(
k
1 + kv |s˜| +
¯t ′(1 + )
)
= −(2 + )c0|s˜|
1+
1 + kv¯
−Gv
( (2 + )c0k|s˜|
(1 + kv)2
)(
k(1 + )
1 + (1 + kv¯) (|¯t | + ¯t)
)
= −(2 + )c0|s˜|
1+
1 + kv¯
because ¯t < 0, so |¯t | = −¯t . Therefore, at quasi-equilibrium, for
p¯ < 0,
p¯ = − (2 + )c0(1 + )
1+(1 + kv)
a0(1 + (1 + kv))(1+) |
¯t |1+.
For s˜ ≥ 0, c111 = 0, and substituting in the expressions for
c¯112 and c¯122, and the quasi-equilibrium equations ¯t ′ = k¯t and
s˜ = (1 + kv¯)¯t , gives that along the quasi-equilibrium line, ¯t =
a0 p¯/2c0cx .
Slow dynamics
For p¯ < 0, (6) gives
 p¯ = G pφγb0|¯t |
2aγ−10 (1 + (1 + kv¯))
(
|¯t |(1+)(γ−1)−1 − a
γ
0 kw
φγb0
)
, (A15)
where
φ =
((1 + )1+(2 + )c0(1 + kv¯))γ−1
(1 + (1 + kv¯))(1+)(γ−1)−1 .
For p¯ ≥ 0, (6) gives
 p¯ = G pγb0¯t(2c0cx )
γ−1
2aγ−10
(
a
γ
0 kw
(2c0cx )γ−1γb0
− ¯tγ−2
)
. (A16)
The equilibrium points are ¯t = 0, ¯t = t∗−, and ¯t = t∗+, where
t∗− = −
∣∣∣∣∣
(
a
γ
0 kw
γb0φ
) 1(1+)(γ−1)−1 ∣∣∣∣∣
t∗+ =
(
a
γ
0 kw
(2c0cx )γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
.
Equilibria
We wish to determine the stability of the equilibria.
Case: t¯ = 0
At ¯t = 0, d p¯/dp = a20 G pkw/4c0cx > 0, so the origin is an
unstable equilibrium.
Case: t¯ = t∗−
From equation (A15), for ¯t such that t∗− < ¯t < 0,  p¯ < 0,
whereas for ¯t such that ¯t < t∗−,  p¯ > 0. Therefore, t∗− is a stable
equilibrium.
Case: t¯ = t∗+
From equation (A16), for ¯t such that 0 < t < t∗+,  p¯ > 0,
whereas for ¯t such that t∗+ < ¯t ,  p¯ < 0. Therefore, t∗+ is a stable
equilibrium.
Magnitudes of the equilibria
If  = 0 and cx < 1, then t∗+ > |t∗−|, and because under
these circumstances ¯t ′ = k¯t , so s˜ = (1 + kv¯)¯t , the exaggerated
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equilibrium will be of greater magnitude than the reduced equi-
librium. But for other combinations of parameter values we cannot
say anything useful about the magnitudes of the equilibria.
CONDITION DEPENDENCE
General function k[s]
We take the cost function for a male with viability v and ornament
size s from equation (7), so that k is a function of s. Then, from
equation (A14), we know that c¯11 ¯t ′ + c¯12 ≈ 0, which gives us
c0
(1 + k[s˜]v¯)3
×
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2(1 + k[s˜]v¯)
(
¯t ′(1 + k[s˜]v¯) − (¯t + ¯t ′v¯)k[s˜]
)
+k ′[s˜](¯t + ¯t ′v¯)
(
(¯t + ¯t ′v¯)(1 − k[s˜]v¯) − 4 ¯t ′v¯(1 + k[s˜]v¯)
)
+2 ¯t ′v¯2(¯t + ¯t ′v¯)2(k ′[s˜])2
− ¯t ′v¯(¯t + ¯t ′v¯)2(1 + k[s˜])k ′′[s˜]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0,
where k ′[·] and k ′′[·] are the first and second derivatives of the
function k[·]. If we suppose that this function is increasing, but
very gradually, then we can suppose k ′′[·] ≈= 0. The quasi-
equilibrium line then satisfies
0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(1 + k[s˜]v¯)
(
¯t ′(1 + k[s˜]v¯) − (¯t + ¯t ′v¯)k[s˜]
)
+
k ′[s˜](¯t + ¯t ′v¯)
(
(¯t + ¯t ′v¯)(1 − k[s˜]v¯) − 4 ¯t ′v¯(1 + k[s˜]v¯)
)
+2 ¯t ′v¯2(¯t + ¯t ′v¯)2(k ′[s˜])2 (A17)
.
Unfortunately an explicit solution for this cannot generally be
found.
Specific k[s] function from the main text
We use the function k[s] from equation (8). Then (if we assume
k ′[s] = 0 for all s, and ignore the discontinuity at s = 0) equation
(A17) gives us that at quasi-equilibrium, ¯t ′ = k[s˜]¯t , and so ¯t ′ =
k+¯t for exaggerated ornaments, whereas ¯t ′ = k−¯t for reduced
ornaments. Following the above procedures then gives
t∗− = −
∣∣∣∣∣
(
a
γ
0 k−w
(2c0)γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
t∗+ =
(
a
γ
0 k+w
(2c0)γ−1γb0
) 1
γ−2
,
and because k− < k+ we have |t∗−| < t∗+.
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